

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD IN PEACE OPERATIONS: IS IT TIME FOR A CHANGE?

**A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD IN PEACE OPERATIONS: IS IT TIME FOR A CHANGE by MAJ Robert S. Mikaloff, USA, 44 pages.

Through the 1990s the U.S. armed forces engaged in peace operations in the former Yugoslavia. The predominance of the U.S. military and the lack of any true conventional peer opponent indicates the potential for commitment to similar situations in the future. This monograph investigates the applicability, relevance and analysis rendered by the current IPB model in peace operations. It will examine the question: Within the context of peace operations, is the current Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process an adequate tool to provide a common, relevant picture for the commander?

The monograph begins by describing the context and intelligence requirements of peace operations. Peace Operations require a different approach than that outlined in FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. FM 34-130 primarily focuses on combat operations and developing enemy courses of action. Rather than approach the problem using the current reductionist techniques used in IPB. Systems approach provides a potential answer to understanding the interaction between all factions involved in peace operations. The monograph therefore examines some concepts from systems theory that prove useful in understanding the dynamics of peace operations. These concepts are applied to case studies of recent operations conducted by the United States Army.

Finally, modifications to the current IPB process are discussed. This monograph proposes changes to the current IPB model that provides additional insights into the motives and objectives of factions in a peace operation.

Introduction

Through the 1990s the U.S. armed forces engaged in peace operations in the former Yugoslavia. The predominance of the U.S. military and the lack of any true conventional peer opponent indicates the potential for commitment to similar situations in the future.¹ The American people and the global community look to the United States military as an effective means to respond to crises and stop the killing.

Peace operations fundamentally change the demands placed on the intelligence system. Peace operations require a different approach than that outlined in FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. FM 34-130 primarily focuses on combat operations and developing enemy courses of action.

The current IPB model provides a framework for analyzing the interaction of military forces during combat operations.² The interaction of military forces is inherently complex. The IPB process takes the complex military environment and dissects the battlefield into the components of battlefield environment, battlefield effects, threat capabilities, and threat courses of action, for analysis. The cumulative result is an effective picture of enemy courses of action given enemy capabilities, weather and terrain. The intent is to provide predictive analysis on what actions the enemy may take and thus guide the commander in developing a friendly course of action.

The nature of the influences at work in peace operations no longer habitually include actively belligerent parties. Rather the factions involved with U. S. forces may include entities no longer warring but engaged in a tenuous dialogue attempting to forge peace. The relations

between former combatants involve a complex array of aims and desires. The roots of the conflict among the former combatants often reside in a myriad of national, ethnic, religious or other differences.

Resolution of the differences between factions demands fully understanding the nature and interaction of the fundamental differences between the factions. Activity by any faction or U.S. forces in a peace operation may elicit a response from the other parties that is contrary to the desired end state. To plan potential actions or reactions requires a clear understanding of the interaction of the forces.

The nature of the interaction between the factions in peace operations is different from the interaction between military forces. An action by any party in peace operations elicits reactions from all parties involved. The complexity of the interaction between all participants in peace operations requires an analytical framework capable of incorporating the complexities inherent to the situation into the picture of the battlefield provided to the commander.

The purpose of this paper is to address the applicability, relevance and analysis rendered by the current IPB model in peace operations. It will examine the question: Within the context of peace operations, is the current Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process an adequate tool to provide a common, relevant picture for the commander?

The paper is divided into seven sections; (1) An introduction that explains the paper and defines the problem, (2) A survey of current doctrine and techniques for intelligence support to peace operations, (3) A survey of unit techniques developed to manage the requirements of peace operations, (4) An examination of some concepts from Systems Theory that have utility in an IPB model, (5) A brief examination of recent peace operations including Somalia and Bosnia, (6) Application of current doctrine, and systems theory to the Somalia and Bosnia case studies, (7) A conclusion including a revision of the IPB process to better support peace operations.

CHAPTER 1

PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE CURRENT IPB MODEL.

Peace Operations

Before evaluating the utility of IPB in any type of operation, a description of the context and requirements of the operation is required. Peace operations differ significantly from conventional operations due primarily to the milieu.³

Two main factors illustrate the fundamental difference in the framework within which military forces operate in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). First is the role of the military force. In MOOTW the military force is not the primary effort but acts in concert with the other elements of national power, economic and information, to support the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.⁴ Second is the operational environment in peace operations. Contrary to conventional operations, US forces find themselves in contact with a broad spectrum of groups ranging from organized groups functioning under a chain of command to disaffected segments of the population.⁵

To cope with this unique operating environment several doctrinal manuals address peace operations. Chief among these publications is FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. This manual is under revision and will be published under a new name FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* (SASO).⁶ FM 100-20 *Stability and Support Operations* explains the unique context of SASO operations and explains the role of military forces in a fundamentally diplomatic effort.⁷ The role of any military force in a peace operation is to maintain separation between factions to ease diplomatic resolution of the conflict.

Key elements of the diplomatic solution may involve the leaders of the military force. The role of the military leader may include actions that lie not in a military mission but in the diplomatic realm. Failure to understand and embrace this military diplomacy may compromise the military mission and achievement of the political objectives.

To support pursuance of the political objective six principles of MOOTW exist to guide military commanders.⁸ These principles are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The first three are familiar to members of the U.S. armed forces. Objective, and security are two of the principles of war listed in the June 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*.⁹ Unity of effort is discussed in FM 100-5 as an element of the principle of war Unity of Command. The principles of restraint, perseverance and legitimacy are unique to the MOOTW environment and form a significant element in the intelligence challenge in MOOTW.

Restraint is defined in Joint Pub 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* as the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective.¹⁰ The use of excessive force may compromise the success of the mission. It is conceivable that lack of restraint creates the perception that one faction is favored over the other or that the military forces are pursuing their own objectives separate from resolution of the conflict. If the military force is no longer perceived as an honest broker the military force loses legitimacy in the eyes of an audience in the area of operations.

The second MOOTW specific principle is perseverance. Joint Publication 3.07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* defines it as the preparation for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.¹¹ Essentially, this states the requirement for patience in any peace operation. Patience in MOOTW provides two benefits. Approaching a peace operation with patience facilitates an effective and long lasting resolution to the conflict. An agreement forged in haste may leave some issues unresolved and

set the stage for continued conflict. The resolution of long standing differences is not instantaneous. The process of negotiation requires awareness of the desires and sensitivities of the factions in conflict. Any lasting resolution of the conflict must account for these sensitivities.

A second benefit of patience is legitimacy. It is the most decisive of the MOOTW principles. Legitimacy is defined in Joint Publication 3.07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* as a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions.¹² The identity of the audience varies from the US public, other nations, other forces involved in the operation or most critically those factions whose differences the military force is helping to resolve. The perception of legitimacy leads the audience, whatever its identity, to support the operation. Failure to maintain legitimacy makes the operation and the military force irrelevant.

The common factor among the MOOTW specific principles is legitimacy. The critical reason for maintaining legitimacy is it elevates any force conducting peace operations above the conflict it is trying to resolve.¹³ This allows a military force to deal effectively with all parties involved with some confidence that it will succeed. Failure to establish legitimacy during peace operations places the viability of the mission in doubt. The perception of favoritism by any faction, it may identify the military force as a target.

The maintenance of legitimacy by any military force in peace operations requires understanding of the fundamental issues that lead to conflict. Understanding the fundamental issues indicates the motives and objectives of factions in a peace operation. The fundamental issues in peace operations are not defined in strictly military terms but may involve culture, economics or religion. The analytical tools used by intelligence staffs must provide the commander relevant information about the root cause of conflict to assess motives and

objectives. To accomplish this the current analytical model is Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

The Current IPB Model

IPB is the primary tool for the intelligence staff and the commander to understand and visualize the battlefield. IPB is a systematic approach for analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area.¹⁴ In essence it dissects the battlefield into discrete elements. Each of these elements is in turn analyzed for its impact on military operations. After analysis these elements are reassembled into a whole which provides the commander a picture of the terrain and enemy that aids in his decision making.¹⁵

The basic document outlining Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*.¹⁶ The manual is divided into sections which describe the IPB process, explain it in depth, outline staff agencies that participate in the process and specific scenarios that differ from standard procedures for conducting IPB.¹⁷

The first task in IPB is Defining the Battlefield Environment. This step includes defining the area of operations (AO), the commander's area of interest (AI), analysis of the environment of the designated AO, and identification of any gaps in intelligence holdings.¹⁸ The focus is to identify and analyze those elements present on the battlefield that have a potential impact on the commander's decisions or available courses of action.¹⁹

The second step is Describe the Battlefield's Effects. This step analyzes the physical environment of the battlefield. The result is knowledge of how the terrain and weather affect both friendly and enemy forces or courses of action.²⁰

Step three is Evaluate the Threat. During this phase of the process the enemy force is evaluated in terms of doctrine, past patterns of operation, organization and equipment. The end

product of this phase is a clear understanding of enemy capabilities based in part on his previous actions during similar circumstances.²¹ In addition enemy forces are examined for any vulnerabilities, weaknesses and elements in his forces that present particularly lucrative targets.

The final phase of IPB is Determine Threat Courses of Action. This step defines possible enemy courses of action given the current situation on the battlefield.²² All possible enemy courses of action are evaluated using the criteria of feasibility, suitability, acceptability and uniqueness. Once a particular course of action qualifies when measured against these criteria it is ranked based on the likelihood of adoption by the enemy.

One key consideration in all four phases of IPB is the importance of those elements of the environment or enemy force that have an impact on friendly operations.²³ An analysis is made of the interaction between friendly forces and the environment including weather and terrain. Another evaluation is made of the interaction of friendly and enemy forces given the limitations imposed by weather and terrain.

Close examination of the numerous factors considered during evaluation of the interaction of friendly and enemy forces reveals a profound level of complexity. The intelligence officer must examine every enemy battlefield operating system, enemy doctrine, training, personalities and equipment.²⁴ The result of this analysis is the formulation of predictions of the enemy's probable course of action. The most critical and difficult task for any intelligence staff is predictive intelligence. The commander relies on the intelligence staff to define who the enemy is and how he is equipped. More importantly the commander expects the intelligence staff to outline what enemy future actions will be. The analysis of future enemy actions in conventional operations is never simple but enemy doctrine and past patterns of operation provide a basis for analysis.

Doctrine and information on past patterns of operation for factions in a peace operation may not exist. This gap in intelligence requires the intelligence staff to more closely evaluate

the information available, including social, economic, religious and ethnic information for clues to future courses of action. To provide the commander relevant information the analytical framework must result in the intelligence staff asking the right questions. The nature of peace operations also requires an assessment of the interrelationship between all factors and factions in peace operations.

Though focused on conventional combat operations, FM 34-130 acknowledges the different nature of the complexity of peace operations. Examples given in the explanation of each phase of the process in chapter two illustrate the different context and elements of peace operations.²⁵ These illustrations, although useful, provide minimal guidance on changes to the process in a given type of peace operation. These recommendations are accomplished through an addendum placed at the end of each explanation showing potential techniques to adapt that particular phase for use in stability and support operations.

Further guidance is available for IPB in peace operations from FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations*. Although out of date with current Army doctrine and terminology, FM 34-7 is the only manual that provides specific guidance and tactics, techniques and procedures for intelligence officers when conducting IPB in peace operations.²⁶ Chapter 3 of FM 34-7 provides definite guidance on adapting the current IPB process to stability and support operations.²⁷ To adapt the current IPB model to Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), FM 34-7 includes the standard factors of analysis present in FM 34-130 and includes new types of factors for consideration. FM 34-7 leads the intelligence officer through each step illustrating those factors of analysis that differ from those in conventional IPB.

The expansion of step one, Define the Battlefield Environment, focuses on the commander's AI. This expanded AI includes not only those factors common in conventional

operations but some factors unique to peace operations. These factors include politics, religion, ethnicity and economy.²⁸

Phase II, Describe the Battlefields Effects evaluates the area of operations in terms of the terrain and weather analysis. To adjust the current IPB model to SASO, FM 34-7 expands the definition of terrain. Terrain is considered not only in geographic terms but in the nature of the population as well. This expanded evaluation of terrain includes an assessment of the economy, political parties, ethnicity and religion.²⁹

The third phase of the IPB process is an evaluation of threat capabilities. The adaptations made to the conventional IPB process in FM 34-7 focuses on traditional order of battle considerations in that the factors considered relate to armed conflict. These order of battle factors are somewhat adjusted for a LIC environment in the level of detail. Some of the factors listed include command and control (C2), terrorist and insurgent organizations, weapons, past patterns of operation and logistics.³⁰

The last phase of IPB evaluates potential threat courses of action.³¹ FM 34-7 gives a comprehensive list of factors to evaluate in determining potential threat courses of action. These factors include the nature and organization of society, economic organization, performance and the distribution of wealth, political organization and the history of the society.³²

FM 34-7 provides a good baseline of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for intelligence staff involved in peace operations. The change in the Army's focus from LIC to peace operations and changes in Army doctrine renders much of FM 34-7 obsolete. The end of the Cold War and increased participation in MOOTW operations created the need for new doctrinal guidance. To meet new operational requirements the Army published FM 100-23 *Peace Operations* in June 1993.³³ FM 100-23 changed and broadened the focus of MOOTW beyond the counterinsurgency focus of the 1990 FM 100-20 *Military Operations in Low*

Intensity Conflict. FM 100-23 acknowledges the new framework within which the Army must operate in peace operations. Intelligence doctrine has not kept pace.

A critical shortcoming of FM 34-7 in the context of peace operations is the focus on counterinsurgency. In each phase reference is made to the host nation and the mitigation or limitation of actions against the host nation.³⁴ Peace operations differ from counterinsurgency operations. Information requirements are not common between the two. The IPB process for LIC does not provide the commander relevant information in peace operations. There has been no update to FM 34-7 to bring it in accordance with current Army doctrine. To fill the gap between the requirements of current operations and current doctrine, units have developed their own TTP for adapting IPB to peace operations.

CHAPTER 2

UNIT DEVELOPED IPB TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES IN PEACE OPERATIONS.

The altering international situation of the 1990's immersed the United States in several peace operations of varying types, either Humanitarian Relief, Peacekeeping and at times situations in the former Yugoslavia that bordered on Peace Enforcement.³⁵ Without practical experience and updated doctrine for conducting IPB in peace operations, units involved in the operations either fell back on existing doctrine or at times derived their own TTP.

Predominantly, intelligence staffs carefully follow current doctrine for guidance on how to execute operations or staff processes with which they have no practical experience. The reliance on current doctrine demands that the analytical tools provided intelligence staffs yield relevant information for the commander. Despite being out of line with current doctrine and the requirements of peace operations, FM 34-7 still serves as a baseline document for conducting IPB in peace operations.³⁶

A prime example of this reliance on out of date doctrine comes from the 82nd Airborne Division. *The 82nd Airborne Division Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Intelligence Operations in MOOTW* is an amalgam of Low Intensity Conflict doctrine as stated in FM 34-7. Chapter II of the 82nd Abn SOP, which covers IPB in MOOTW, is a direct copy of Chapter III, IPB from FM 34-7.³⁷

The direct reproduction of field manuals was done despite changes in Army doctrine that includes a broader based perspective on peace operations. This perspective includes,

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as Counterinsurgency.³⁸ These changes were codified in doctrinal manuals such as FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, June 1993.

In the course of the 1990s during which the US Army conducted several peace operations, many intelligence officers and staffs took the time to capture lessons learned from their experiences. The writings include experiences from operations in Haiti, Panama, Somalia and Bosnia. Most publications are supportive of the current IPB model. The common message is the current IPB process is valid and should be scrupulously practiced.³⁹ These judgments are in large part based on the utility of the current IPB model in defining immediate physical threats to friendly forces from military, paramilitary and terrorist groups.⁴⁰ Force Protection being an important focus in all operations, is well served by this focus on groups with the potential to harm friendly forces.

The one recurring theme in most observations of IPB conducted in peace operations is the extreme importance of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) as a means to collect information on the factions in conflict and potential violent incidents.⁴¹ Given the level of threat and the generally urban nature of the operations, technical means of collection can be severely denigrated.⁴² Peace operations do not lend themselves to the highly technical intelligence collection architectures the US relies on. Units find themselves dependent on HUMINT from the local population or unit reconnaissance to gain important intelligence about the disposition and intent of the various entities involved.

Units involved in peace operations make few changes to the current IPB process. This may indicate that the current model is adequate or it is a symptom of the relatively short duration of most peace operations conducted by the United States. The one notable exception is the 1st Infantry Division and its experiences in the former Yugoslavia.

Major General David Grange, Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division and the Division Assistant Chief of Staff G2, Lieutenant Colonel John Rovegno produced an article for

Armed Forces Journal International after returning from duty with the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.⁴³ The article captured some insights on lessons learned in conducting IPB in a peace operation. The article shows the continuing and appropriate focus on armed threats to friendly forces. The authors state this requirement and then go beyond it to address some of the unique considerations for IPB in peace operations. MG David Grange and LTC John Rovegno address the interrelationships between all participants in peace operations. The notability of the 1st ID's approach is illustrated by this quote:

We need to keep in mind that actions need not always result in "battle victory." Our actions may, like in a chess match, set up an eventual domino effect of successful activity, but on the surface, the initial outcomes will be difficult to assess. (Grange and Rovegno, 1998)

This statement suggests the critical difference between IPB in conventional operations and the requirements of peace operations. A graphic or brief of the current enemy situation provides only a snapshot in time of what the Area of Operations looks like.⁴⁴ Based on conducting operations against an organized military this snapshot is very useful. Intelligence staffs can look at the enemy current situation, evaluate it against the terrain, enemy doctrine or past patterns of operation and offer the maneuver commander estimates on future enemy courses of action.

A crucial difference between peace operations and conventional operations is the current snapshot of the AO may not indicate future courses of action.⁴⁵ The factors of analysis in peace operations are not composed of conventional military indicators such as force dispositions and equipment as found in conventional operations. They are often tied to demographic or sociological factors such as economics, ethnicity, religion or politics. A situation template, even when combined with a population status overlay cannot adequately reflect the history, sympathies, loyalties or intentions of the population.

The continuing commitment in Bosnia and the potential for future commitments in SASO operations requires intelligence staffs to provide commanders with information relevant to the problems faced in peace operations. The current IPB process fails to yield the type of information required to portray the complexities of peace operations. The conventional IPB process focuses on conventional operations. The IPB process as adapted for LIC focuses on counterinsurgency operations. To furnish the information on the interactions and relationships involved in peace operations requires a more holistic perspective. Systems theory is a tool which provides this holistic view and allows for analysis of the relationships between factions in Peace Operations.

CHAPTER 3

SYSTEMS THEORY

When faced with complex problems humans traditionally try to reduce them into smaller segments.⁴⁶ These segments are more easily analyzed and understood. Through understanding the nature of its parts, the problem can be reassembled and understood as a whole. This thought process is based on the presupposition that the final analysis of the problem is equal to the sum of the analyses of the various segments.⁴⁷

The Army approached the problem of understanding the battlefield using this logic. It devised IPB as a way of reducing the battlefield into more easily analyzed segments. The analyzed segments are reassembled into a cogent picture of the battlefield. The current IPB model has served the Army well in times of conventional conflict but the requirements of peace operations may be better understood using the framework of systems theory.

Systems theory is a theory of wholeness. Rather than reduce the elements of a problem into segments it considers the nature and interrelationships between those segments.⁴⁸ Holistic evaluation of the elements of the problem and their interrelationships provides a greater understanding of both the elements and the problem. Peace operations are political in nature and occur within the boundaries of a single state.⁴⁹ The causes of the hostility are societal divisions within the state in conflict. The nature of these divisions include ethnic, political or religious beliefs.

The population of a society organizes itself among the categories that divide the society.⁵⁰ If the division is political then the members of the population move to organize

themselves and associate with one political group or another. That being the case, the focus of the solution to the conflict lies in the society involved. Sociology, the study of human society is in essence the study of social systems. Society can be defined as a system because a change in one element causes changes in others and the entire society exhibits behaviors that are different than its various parts.⁵¹

In peace operations this translates to the problems resident in the interaction between various segments of society. Taken in isolation, elements of society may exhibit no negative behaviors. Only in combination with the other segments of society do its actions become belligerent. Additionally, a change in one segment of society leads to changes or actions in other segments.⁵² In the course of interactions inherent in a society, a change or action by one segment generates an action or change in one or more of the other segments.

The interactions of all segments of a society provide a complex and interconnected web of relationships. Several ideas in Systems Theory provide a conceptual framework for analysis of the relationships.

Interactions, Not Additivity.⁵³

The first and most fundamental concept involves feedback by the system from an input or change.⁵⁴ The central theme of this concept states that reaction to change or action by one entity in a system or to an input to the system by an external entity may not be proportional.

In the context of peace operations this equates to a slight infraction of a peace agreement by one faction generating a reaction completely out of proportion to the violation. Conversely, a grand attempt to resolve the conflict by a former belligerent or external agency may elicit a small reaction from the other parties.

Behavior Changes the Environment⁵⁵

The feedback of the system to input or actions taken to modify it is altered by the nature of the actions or inputs.⁵⁶ Final results of actions taken to change the system cannot be predicted from analysis of the effects of the separate actions. If several actions are taken separately over time to change the way one entity in a peace operation behaves, the feedback or reaction may or may not be in line with stated objectives. If those same actions are taken simultaneously, the feedback or reaction may be the converse of the desired end state.

Strategies depend on the Strategies of Others.⁵⁷

The self organizing quality of systems assert that as the lines dividing a society in conflict harden, the groups that form in a social system will act to protect themselves.⁵⁸ In order to accomplish this they must often attempt to anticipate the potentially hostile actions of others. The anticipation of an action taken by a hostile group may lead another to take action to protect itself. Any group, whether defined by race, ethnicity or religion may take preemptive action in anticipation of actions by groups in opposition.

The actions taken by any faction can cause a change in the environment in which it operates.⁵⁹ One action or input to a system may produce one type of feedback at a certain time. The same action taken later may produce a completely different reaction. This is particularly true if the original action was conducted at the expense of other factions in the society.

Circular Effects⁶⁰

All of these situations may evolve into a cycle of input and feedback. This serves to escalate progressively a potential conflict between elements of a society until the situation that started the conflict is no longer recognizable. This leads to the idea of unintended consequences. In every situation described above the initiator of the action does not anticipate the response given. The potential for unintended consequences holds true not only for factions involved in the conflict but those external agencies that may try to intervene in the conflict. Critical to providing a commander predictive intelligence in a peace operation is addressing the potential for unintended consequences.

In peace operations the actions of one faction do not solely involve itself or in the case of a violent act, the victim. Any action has an impact on all entities involved in the conflict. This impact or consequence may not manifest itself immediately. The full outcome may take years to evidence itself.⁶¹

To capture the complexity and consequences of interactions between the factions, the environment and the consequences of those interactions requires an analytical framework capable of evaluating the situation as a whole. Reduction of a peace operation into constituent parts or analyzing each of the factions independently then reassembling those segments ignores the interrelationships between the factions. The current IPB model divides the battlefield into segments for evaluation. In reducing the situation into segments for analysis we provide ourselves a snapshot of the truth at the time of the snapshot, ignoring patterns of behavior, interactions that initiate the behavior and conditions that led to the conflict. Only through an evaluation of the situation holistically can a prediction be made of the consequences of interaction among factions in a peace operation.

Experience provides a medium from which to evaluate the utility of the above systems concepts in IPB. The two operations chosen to do this evaluation are the operations in Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES

Somalia

On January 27, 1991 a popular uprising forced Somali President Siad Barre from office. He had ruled Somalia as an autocrat since a coup brought him to power in 1969.⁶² His rule was characterized by brutal repression and the abuse of traditional societal systems. He left behind a divided country, a ruined economy and no perceivable hope of recovery. During his tenure Barre completed the destruction of a clan system already damaged by colonization. This clan system had sustained the Somali people for centuries.

The Somali people existed under a system of clans and kinship. Their identities were determined not by any state entity but by association with several main clans.⁶³ The basic element in the clan system is the family. It is characterized by blood ties and unwritten rules of social conduct. The impact of the clan society extended beyond familial relations into the political, and economic life of Somalis.⁶⁴ This involvement in economics and politics ensured the dependence of the clans on one another for survival and stability.

Colonialism was the first phenomenon to seriously corrupt the pastoral clan social system in Somalia.⁶⁵ Somalia was divided between several states including Britain, France, Italy and Ethiopia. All laid claim to sections of Somalia. The colonial powers brought with them the requirements for structure and bureaucracy. Their systems of control, government and commerce conflicted with traditional Somali values and customs.

The impact of colonial rule started the dissolution of traditional Somali life. The international market system brought pressure on Somali society.⁶⁶ The impact of this was the erosion of traditional Somali morals and acceleration of the dissolution of traditional Somali existence. The unification of Somalia after the departure of the colonial powers brought additional pressures on Somalia. The post colonial elections were rife with parochialism. Various factions vied for power in the elections. They sought power not to effect improvement but to exploit that power for their own benefit.⁶⁷

After a series of failed democratic governments Siad Barre came to power. Promises of a return to liberal democracy proved false and Barre solidified his position through establishing a strong central security force and strong support from the Marehan, Dolbahante and Ogaden clans.⁶⁸

Under the leadership of Barre, Somalia waged an unsuccessful war against Ethiopia in 1977-78.⁶⁹ This failure eroded Barre's power and caused him to use brutal and arbitrary means to remain in power. Barre turned to two strategies to protect his regime. He filled most critical posts in the government with associates or relatives and he used growing clan rivalry to redirect their energies away from his regime.⁷⁰ Despite these measures Barre's power continued to erode into the 1980's.

Exacerbating the situation in Somalia were the economic problems the country experienced. The destruction of the peasant farming system and international competition in the livestock industry left the country's economy in shambles forcing it to import food and turn to the International Monetary Fund for support.⁷¹ The economic collapse coupled with a repressive regime instigated a growing resistance in Somalia. Several colonels from the Mijerteen clan were the first to attempt a coup.⁷² Barre's response was brutal and focused on civilian members of the Mijerteen clan as well as livestock and homes. It is at this point that the development of the warlord militias started.

The Mijerteen were driven from Somalia by Barre's reprisals. In response the Mijerteen formed the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SSDF). Other clans, operating in opposition to each other, formed other groups. These included the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the Isaq clan, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) from the Ogaden clan and the United Somali Conference (USC) from the Hawiye clan.⁷³

Somali political organizations formed rigidly along clan lines. As a result Barre chose most of his closest advisors from his own blood relations. The clan division extended to the Somali Army which came to be viewed as a tool of the Marehan Clan.⁷⁴ These factors served to exacerbate the clan division among Somalis.

It was in southern Somalia that the dissolution of the state became most acute. The factions formed by the various clans all had as their charter removal of Siad Barre from power. The clans moved to armed violence to achieve their goal of ousting Barre and in 1991 the clans succeeded.⁷⁵ Critical in the development of the warlike clan militias was the substitution of warlords for the tradition clan leaders. It was in this environment that men like Mohamed Farah Aideed and the Habir Gedir militia came to the forefront.

Siad Barre's departure left a power vacuum in Somalia. Depending on the region, that vacuum was filled by different organizations. In northeastern Somalia the SSDF established a rough stability. The SNM gained control in northwestern Somalia. It was in Mogadishu and Kismayu that there was no clear assumption of power among any group.⁷⁶ It was into this environment of anarchy that the United Nations sent forces to relieve human suffering. In April 1992 the United Nations Observer Mission Somalia (UNOSOM) was sent to Somalia to observe a cease fire among the warring militias and assist in distribution of humanitarian aid.⁷⁷ UNOSOM achieved limited success but a larger more robust intervention was judged to present the most promise for a lasting resolution to the problem.

In December 1992 the United States deployed troops to Somalia for service in the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF). The deployment focused initially on logistics requirements imposed by the deployment.⁷⁸ Plans for the number of troops to deploy were adjusted based on the environment in Somalia. The movement of UNITAF was accomplished under permissive circumstances. The ease of deployment caused a reduction of troops deployed for UNITAF.

The UNITAF forces initially operated with little interference from the clan militias. This is a result of US special envoy Robert Oakley conducting numerous meetings with militia leaders before the deployment.⁷⁹ The militia leaders, including Aideed agreed not to interfere with the deployment. In fact, some leaders saw benefit in cooperating with UNITAF in that a success would at least forestall the UN from declaring Somalia a UN trusteeship during resolution of the conflict and establishment of a legitimate government.⁸⁰

On January 4, 1993 the United Nations sponsored a meeting between the militias at Addis Ababa. The focus of the meeting was to set agendas and participants for following meetings. The second Addis Ababa meeting in March 1993 continued the work of Addis Ababa I. During the meeting structures were developed to allow for transition of Somali government functions from the fractious anarchy to a ruling council, the Transitional National Council (TNC), with representation from each of the clans.⁸¹ Procedures were provided to try and eliminate militia dominance of political life. The results of Addis Ababa II gave optimism to all involved. The UN believed that the agreement provided a realistic solution for governing Somalia. That optimism was not shared by many Somalis.

Militia leaders were displeased and threatened by the results of Addis Ababa II. The Warlords, including Aideed foresaw a dilution of their power from the process started at Addis Ababa I.⁸²

Despite noble intentions the UN and US failed to achieve the desired endstate. The net effect of UN and US intervention in Somalia is a tale of noble intent, failed promises and a failure to understand the impact of their actions. Several critical factors were ignored or improperly handled during the Somalia operation. These factors, if properly identified and acted on may have changed the final outcome in Somalia.

Critical in the evolution of the peace process was the handling of the traditional clan leadership and the warlords. The United Nations and the United States presented conflicting messages about the legitimacy of each. Although making attempts to highlight the role of traditional clan leaders in any new Somali political system, the UN and US gave strong indications that the true power resided not in traditional clan leaders but among the militia leaders.⁸³

The militia leaders gained legitimacy through their de facto recognition by the US as the people to coordinate UNITAF operations with. The success of the UNITAF deployment initially required the cooperation of the warlords. To gain a permissive initial entry into Somalia, Robert Oakley negotiated with the major militias to allow UNITAF entry.⁸⁴

Further legitimacy for the warlords came through their participation and dominant role among Somalis at the Addis Ababa meetings. The stated intent among the UN negotiators was to return Somalia to traditional systems of social order. In fact the opposite message came out of the meetings. The signatories of the Addis Ababa meeting were the militia leaders.⁸⁵

The effect of legitimizing militia leaders was the overshadowing of the traditional clan leaders. Before colonization it was the clan system of pastoral subsistence agriculture that sustained Somalis and the peace.

The cooperative nature of the clan system fostered positive interactions among the clans. In turning to and relying on traditional clan leaders during negotiations the peace agreements would have been structured within a framework that had previously worked and the

Somalis were comfortable with. Instead the people with whom the greatest chance existed to achieve a more permanent end to famine and fighting were ignored. Rather than receiving support and protection from the US the clan leaders were pushed to the rear through the legitimization of militia leaders.

Bosnia

Bosnia is situated at the crossroads between Europe and Asia. It has been the focus of religious conflict between the Roman Catholic Church, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam since the 4th Crusade in 1203.⁸⁶ This conflict and the shift in dominance of the area between the three major religions created tremendous religious diversity in a compact area. This diversity among populations existing so proximate to one another created the conditions for future conflict.

The Versailles treaty ending World War I created the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.⁸⁷ The treaty forged the Kingdom of Yugoslavia out of several republics, each republic primarily built around a different ethnic group and each defined by a different nation.

World War II and the invasion of the Nazis dismembered the kingdom and brought the Ustache collaborators to power in Croatia.⁸⁸ Two other groups, Serb Chetnik and Tito's communists, competed for power in Yugoslavia not only against the pro-Nazi Ustache but with one another.

Tito's victory and ascension to power in 1945 tacked together the diverse ethnic groups.⁸⁹ The concept of being Yugoslavian was always tenuous at best among the Yugoslavian population. The threat posed by the Soviet Union overcame internal dissension in Yugoslavia. The identification of the Soviet Union as a common enemy fostered a sense of cohesion among the ethnic groups. This cohesion wavered when Tito died in 1980.

A collective presidency filled the void left by Tito. The members of this collective presidency included one representative from each of the republics.⁹⁰ Despite the attempts made to build a national identity among the various ethnic groups, the population's affiliation with being Yugoslavian unraveled after Tito's death.

Two critical events exacerbated the dissolution of Yugoslavian national identity. The fall of the Soviet Union eliminated the primary threat to Yugoslavia's survival and a primary unifying concept in Yugoslavian national identity.⁹¹ Coupled with the fall of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's economy reversed. Yugoslavian income had increased in real terms during Tito's reign. The 1980's brought a reverse to that trend and Yugoslav income decreased in real terms.

The state of Yugoslavia began the process of rupture in earnest after the 14th Communist Party Conference in January 1990.⁹² By the end of 1990 multi-party elections were held in each of the republics. Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia elected non-communist parliaments while Serbia and Montenegro elected a majority from Slobodan Milosevic's Social Democratic Party (ex-communist) to parliament.⁹³ Yugoslavia's collective presidency collapsed in 1991. The republics saw this as an opportunity to separate from the dying state. The disappearance of the central government caused the initial clashes which erupted when Croatian police fought Serb militia.⁹⁴ Shortly thereafter Slovenia and Croatia declared independence.

The Yugoslav Army (JNA) tried to crush the secession in the republics. The bulk of the JNA was Serbian. Since the number of ethnic Serbs in Slovenia is small the JNA had little motivation to pursue the operation.⁹⁵ That was not the case in Croatia. Croatia was twelve percent ethnic Serb. The JNA forces attempted to carve out safe enclaves for Croatia's Serb minority.⁹⁶ In response to the violence, the United Nations successfully negotiated a cease fire in November 1991.

With the end of activity in Croatia the JNA moved into Bosnia-Herzegovina. With military support from the JNA, Bosnian Serbs gained enough confidence to declare their autonomy and attempt to form the Republica Srpska.⁹⁷

Identifying the causes of the dissolution of the Yugoslav state is difficult. The conflict between the different ethnic groups is complex and not necessarily simple hyper nationalist hatred. The answer lies both in history and the present. The genesis of the Balkan conflict is a combination of factors rooted in history and in current situations resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav economy.

The historical elements of the conflict grew out of the collapse of the Byzantine Empire. During various stages of Balkan history, each of the ethnic groups were the base population of a great state. For the Serbs it was immediately before the fall of Constantinople to the Turks. The Serbs under the leadership of Stephan Dusan successfully used Byzantine preoccupation with invading Turks to transform what used to be a province of the Byzantine Empire into a great kingdom.⁹⁸ The new kingdom included present day Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia and Northern Greece.

The next great empire in the Balkans was the Ottoman Empire. The forces of Mehmet II conquered all of the territories of the Byzantine Empire including all of Greece, and the former Yugoslavia.⁹⁹ The conquest of the region by Muslim forces introduced Islam into an area dominated by Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Many Christians, both Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox converted to Islam to avoid the oppressive measures the empire pursued against Christians.¹⁰⁰

Croatia enjoyed its time in the sun during the Austro-Hungarian Empire.¹⁰¹ The Croatians developed the same ethnocentrism that develops in any ruling class. A common religion aided in Croat identification with the government in Vienna. This identification continues even today.

Coupled with the factors of former greatness a second set of factors contributed to conflict in the Balkans. The second set of factors involves the failure of the economic system in the area. The economic failure occurred during the 1980's through to the collapse of the Yugoslav government. Each of the republics suffered during the economic downturn.

When taken together the net effect is that each group, seeing the pitiful state of their condition looked for something to cling to that gave them some hope.¹⁰² Many people in the former Yugoslavia never regarded themselves truly as Yugoslavian but as citizens of the various republics, Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Their economic problems served to strengthen that affiliation with their republic.

The concept of being Serb, Croat, or Muslim brings all of the baggage of history with it. In the case of the Serbs the people looked back at their former greatness. This proves to be easy in that their religion, Eastern Orthodoxy, provides a constant reminder. The final victory of Muslim forces over the Serbian kingdom is remembered in religious as well as secular memory.¹⁰³ The onset of poverty, coupled with memories of greatness and the proximate location of people who represent the cause of the end of that greatness creates frustration.

All that lacked in the mix was a point of ignition, something that could mobilize the latent emotions and frustrations. In the former Yugoslavia the point of ignition was political leaders. Men like Slobodan Milosevic who were able to tie historical enmities and economic problems together to focus the people on a cause of their problems that was external to their own ethnic group.¹⁰⁴

The entry of the United States into the situation came after abortive attempts at ending the conflict by the European Union and the United Nations. US effort focused on resolution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁰⁵ US troop deployment came after the Dayton or Framework agreement.¹⁰⁶ Under the Dayton agreement Bosnia-Herzegovina divided into two

areas. One is controlled by a Croat-Muslim federation, the other controlled by ethnic Serbs.¹⁰⁷

The demarcation line was controlled by the Implementation Force (IFOR).

The result of US involvement is undefined. The US mission continues without any indication of ending. Peace has been achieved if peace is the absence of armed conflict. Bosnia awaits a final resolution of the conflict. A final and lasting resolution rests on the identification of the root causes of the conflict and circumstances that facilitated the movement to armed conflict. Final resolution involves more than simply separating belligerents and maintaining the peace through force of arms.

CHAPTER 5

COMPARING RESULTS OF IPB AND SYSTEMS THEORY ANALYSIS.

Intelligence staffs require an analytical model that yields relevant information for the commander. To judge the relevance of information derived from the current IPB model and any modified process for peace operations requires comparing results under the current model with those of a modified system. Elements of the IPB process that lend themselves to a systems approach will be applied against the case studies and the differences between the current model and a systems approach discussed.¹⁰⁸

Phase I Define the Battlefield Environment: The two critical steps in phase one of the IPB process are defining the AO and AI.¹⁰⁹ The commander's AO is designated by higher headquarters and is rarely subject to change. The commander and staff determine the AI.

In defining the AI the current model evaluates a snapshot of the current situation. FM 34-7 and FM 34-130 list evaluation of factors such as political groups, private volunteer organizations (PVO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), the role of clans and religion.¹¹⁰ Application against the case studies shows the inadequacy of the snapshot of the current situation when in a peace operation. The current situation as found in Bosnia by US forces reveals a conflict born of hyper nationalism and economic turmoil. It is a picture of hyper nationalist ethnic groups looking to gain more land and consolidate their control so as not to lose power. What is missing is the enabling concept behind the ability of individuals to rise as leaders of these ethnic groups and move their respective ethnic groups to attack the others.

The potential answer lies in adding time as a factor in defining the AI. Examination of the historical experiences of the factions provides evidence explaining attitudes and beliefs. Evaluating that experience against the current situation may explain their behavior. Looking at the history of Serbs in the Balkans exposes some experiences that can be used to manipulate the Serb population. These experiences can be manipulated by those who would seek to exploit civil turmoil for personal power.

History reveals that the Serbs were once a great power in the Balkans. At least twice in their history they heroically fought and were defeated by greater powers. Those powers, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire are represented by the other ethnic groups present in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The condition of economic despair provided an opportunity for translation of historical events into hatred of the Muslim and Croat groups in Bosnia. The sources of past trials became the target of blame for present Serb difficulties.

In the case of Somalia the AI exposes a set of militia groups loosely tied to clans. These militia groups fought over control of land and resources. In a conventional operation the militia poses the greatest threat and would therefore be the most significant actor in the AI. The militia in Somalia was a tool of heretofore minor political figures.

The AI in Somalia included the major militias, NGOs and PVOs, clans and areas where the previously mentioned groups operated. By including analysis of the AO over time in defining the AI some additional and useful detail comes forward. The traditional system of society in Somalia was governed by clans. The corporate actions of the clan would be directed by the clan leader. Colonization and independence changed the system in Somalia. Clans lost their importance. In their place the colonizing powers brought modern bureaucracies to perform government functions. The Somali social system did not return to its previous condition after independence.

The history of Somalia's political struggles after gaining independence is a story of quests for personal power and riches by all who gained or sought public office. Rather than revert to the cooperative system in place before colonization Somalia found itself victimized by modern liberal democracy. Elections quickly mutated into quests for personal power and clan hegemony. This spiral into parochial pursuits led to the rule of Siad Barre and his eventual ouster.

During Barre's rule the clan system survived but his manipulation of the clan system fundamentally changed the clan system from mutual support and interaction into a fight for clan hegemony. After the departure of Barre the clans continued the quest for hegemony. Seeking to protect themselves, the clans moved to armed conflict for survival. Minor political figures found an opportunity to continue their quest for power through leading clan militias. Where political office had previously been the road to power and wealth, the new system required military victory. The method used to gain personal aggrandizement changed. Rather than use the political system to position themselves for personal gain, the new warlords used armed violence to gain and enforce their power.

Siad Barre played one clan against another to negate any cooperative effort to unseat him. This developed a heightened sense of self protection among the clans. The warlords were able to manipulate this heightened sense of self protection to compromise traditional clan leadership and seize power through armed violence. Without the turmoil and insecurity brought about by poverty and political corruption the warlords could not have manipulated the clans into personal armies.

Adding the element of time to the AI in Somalia shows the evolution of the Somali society from a pastoral clan system into anarchy. The causes of change to the social system can be traced to events such as colonization, a failed attempt at democracy and the reign of Siad Barre. These events are inputs to the Somali social system. Colonization causes the first

departure from the traditional Somali social system. The attempt at democracy continued the degeneration of the clan system through the imposition of a hierarchical system. Within that system Somalis sought leadership not for service to Somalia but for personal and clan benefit. Siad Barre manipulated the self-protective nature of the clan system to keep the clans in opposition to each other. The end result was the change of the Somali social system from clan cooperation to clans seeking to further their power and prosperity through armed conflict.

Phase II Describe the Battlefields Effects analyzes the population and terrain. The factors of analysis include the standard military aspects of terrain and demographic items such as ethnicity, politics, economics and religion. In particular importance are areas where different groups involved in the conflict are regarded with sympathy or hatred. The value to a commander of this population status can help define areas where conflict can start. In the context of resolving the conflict this portrayal of the situation fails to address the root problems.

In conventional IPB as well as IPB for Low Intensity Conflict, the evaluation of the population is conducted during terrain analysis, population being considered an element of terrain. Considering that peace operations are primarily political in nature they revolve around the society in conflict thus the population represents key terrain.

Evaluation of the populations in the case studies would reveal the main ethnic groups and clans. It would further define the major areas where these groups lived. Often these groups would be intermingled. Evaluation of the population in Bosnia would reveal the main ethnic groups, Serb, Croat and Muslim. It would further define the major areas where these ethnic groups lived. Economic factor analysis would depict major industry, the economic status of elements of the population and the relative health of the population, the state and the economy.

In both case studies economics played a major role in initiating the conflict. The conventional IPB process identifies economic factors operating within the AO. The critical

information for understanding the conflict is identification of the economic break point, the reactions and the interactions of ethnic groups or clans to the economic crisis.

In the case of Somalia the causes of economic crisis were an amalgam of changes to the Somali system by colonization and the gross abuses of Siad Barre. The change to the system was corruption of the Somali clan system. Previous to colonization the clans were interdependent and relatively peaceful. Economics, social structure and subsistence revolved around the clan system. Colonization forced a new and unfamiliar system on the Somalis. The Somalis did not evolve into the system and the functioning of the system relied on foreigners, not Somalis.

The move to liberal democracy further distanced the Somalis from the societal system they were comfortable with. As a result of their inability to make the leap from clans to representative government the democracy failed. This failure led to anarchy and economic failure.

The conflict in Bosnia has similar roots. The experiment with democracy in the Former Yugoslavia and subsequent economic failure initiated a chain of events that led to the current situation.

The genesis of the crisis in both Somalia and Bosnia was economic. The economic well being of citizens in both areas was threatened. Taken in isolation, economic problems would not create the level of violence found in Bosnia and Somalia. Violence resulted from the combination of economic problems and ethnic or clan animosity. The interaction of the factors of ethnic or clan animosity and economic problems led to the violence.

Phase III, Evaluation of the Threat includes the creation or update of threat models and identification of threat capabilities. In the environments encountered no doctrine or model exists for the militias so the intelligence staff would need to research past patterns of operation. These past patterns of operation serve as threat models for use in Phase IV, Determine Threat

Courses of Action. These patterns when applied against the current situation provide potential threat courses of action.

The changes to the conventional IPB process outlined in FM 34-7 include the evaluation of the threat organization. In LIC a data base on the threat is often incomplete so intelligence staffs need to complete it. This data base includes organization, training, arms, patterns of operation, political or religious beliefs and sources of support.

When applied against the case studies these factors provide an analysis of the armed elements of the factions. Peace operations being chiefly a political endeavor the requirements for evaluation exceed just the armed elements of the factions. The requirement is to look beyond the armed elements in peace operations to the leadership and objectives for each faction in the conflict.

In the Somalia mission Evaluation of the Threat illustrates the training, arms, and past operations of the militias. The militia received no formal training other than those members who had served in the Somali Military. The arms were mainly individual weapons, machine guns and Rocket Propelled Grenades. Past operations included seizing control of areas of the country and precluding entry of opposition militias.

The Bosnian problem presents much the same type of results. The armed elements of the factions possessed a great number of sophisticated weapons and the engagements were often more intense.

The enumeration of the capabilities based on this analysis closely mirrors that of conventional IPB. The militias can attack, defend and harass the opposition. The difference is only an order of magnitude. The smaller the armed elements involved the smaller the battle.

To be of value this phase needs to address the objectives not only of the military force but of the factional leadership. These objectives included maintenance of their leadership position and the increase in power relative to the other entities in the conflict.

Phase IV, Determine Threat Courses of Action provides the product of the analysis done in the previous phases. This phase illustrates enemy potential courses of action given the situation of the terrain, the weather, his past patterns of operation and friendly dispositions.

Factional courses of action cannot be evaluated in isolation. Each must be evaluated against possible reactions of the other factions and the actions of any force interposed between them. In each case the actions of each entity in the peace operation must be evaluated against the political position, loyalties and desires of the other.

In Bosnia, the military force interposed between the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims walks a tight rope while interacting with the factions. Any action taken to end further violence or separate belligerents must be evaluated against the responses of the subject of the action. In addition the action must be evaluated against the responses of the factions that are not the target.

As the lines between the factions harden, each will take action to protect itself. Beyond that each faction will try to anticipate the behavior of the others and take action to forestall any movements by the others that may prove detrimental to its survival.

An example of this from the Bosnia problem is Serb reaction to the formation of the Croat-Bosnian Muslim Federation. The United Nations regarded the formation of the federation as part of the answer to final resolution of the problem. It effectively eliminated one third of the conflict by ending fighting between Croats and Muslims. The Serbian perspective was different.

The Serbs regarded this federation as an alliance formed to battle the ethnic Serbs. The two parties that the Serbs were in competition with for control joined forces thus increasing the odds against eventual Serb success. The reaction was increased operations by the Bosnian Serb Army in attempting to eliminate enclaves inhabited by the other ethnic groups. What appeared

to be a success to the UN served to increase violence which in fact instigated a more violent reaction from the UN and NATO in the form of air strikes.

Failure to evaluate friendly actions in a peace operation often leads to unintended consequences. Somalia provides an additional example of efforts to resolve a conflict that resulted in unintended consequences.

In late February 1993 UNITAF took action to disarm an element of Aideed's militia in Kismayu. The intent was to lessen the potential for violence in that built up area. The end result was two cascading events. The first was the entry into Kismayu of a different militia under the control of one of Aideed's competitors. The second was a series of riots in Mogadishu staged by Aideed followers and fueled by the perception that UNITAF showed favoritism for one of the militia groups.

The current IPB model, focused on conventional operations fails to capture the subtleties of peace operations. IPB as described in FM 34-130 and FM 34-7 provides a snapshot of the current situation that leads to linear cause and effect analysis. Linear analysis does not meet the requirements in peace operations.

What may seem to be a simple problem with simple solutions may in fact be a complex web of interrelationships that must be untangled. Intelligence staffs, in order to provide relevant information to the commander must untangle the web of interrelationships to find the roots and motives for conflict. Finding the fundamental causes and motives makes analysis of future courses of action and predictive intelligence possible.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

For the rest of the 1990's and early into the next century the United States Army will be involved in peace operations. Given the requirements and complexity of peace operations the current IPB model is inadequate. Peace operations introduce new complexities into military operations. These new complexities result in a change in intelligence requirements. These changes render the analysis and intelligence gleaned from the IPB process insufficient for the needs of the commander.

In conventional operations the focus of intelligence is the opposing military force. Military forces are a major consideration in peace operations but the primary focus is on political, social and economic factors. These factors cannot be evaluated in isolation. Analysis must be conducted in the context of the operation and in regard to each other.

The current IPB process serves to define the conventional battlefield for commanders. By following the IPB process terrain, weather and enemy are merged into a coherent picture of the conventional battlefield for the commander.

The IPB process for LIC as outlined in FM 34-7 represents an old model of analysis. This thinking resulted from super power confrontations in third world countries. The United States Army needed a system to aid commanders in combating insurgencies. The change from super power confrontation in third world countries to reestablishing stability internal to failed states changes the requirements for IPB.

Providing commanders with relevant information in peace operations requires a change in the substance of the analytical framework of IPB and the approach to analysis. The changes suggested are minor in terms of form. The phases of the IPB process represent a well established format. The substantive change in the analytical framework of IPB for peace operations involve the perspective of the analyst and evaluation of the interaction of culture, economics, religion, society and the addition of the element of time.

The elements of the shift in analytical perspective entail impartiality and the understanding of interactions among all parties involved in a peace operation. Impartiality is easier when the terms used in analysis are objective. The term enemy or threat is used throughout both the conventional IPB process as outlined in FM 34-130 and the LIC process in FM 34-7. This implies a parochialism and vilifies the subject of analysis. The perspective from which the analyst must evaluate the situation is impartial not parochial. The idea is to regard the belligerent parties as subjectively and non-judgmentally as possible.

The second component in changing the analytical perspective is understanding the interactions of factions in the peace operation. None of the parties involved, whether belligerent factions or military forces interposed between belligerents operate as separate elements. One groups action effects them all.

The next element of change is time. Critical to understanding the cause of any factional activities in a peace operation is understanding the evolution of that society and how it fits into the societal system of the state.

The final change is understanding the interaction between culture and extant circumstances. Over time societies and cultures develop a system of conduct and interaction with other cultures and societies. The input of current circumstances can act to change that system generating new types of behavior in the population. In a state where the international

community initiates a peace operation the type of behavior generated by the interaction is unacceptable and thus causes international intervention.

Based on the change of analytical mindset, time and interaction the changes to the current IPB model are extensions of the current phases of IPB. These extensions encompass the requirements of peace operations. With regard to factors unique to peace operations the elements cannot be analyzed in isolation. Rather the analysis needs to be cumulative, the results of one phase are carried over and analyzed against the factors of the next.

Phase I of the current model both for conventional operations and LIC is fundamentally sound. There is no need to change the definition of the area of operations. It is the definition of the Area of Interest that would need modification for peace operations.

In determining the Area of Interest the new archetype of peace operations requires an appreciation and evaluation of the history of the entities in conflict. Understanding the sensitivities and history can lead to a greater understanding of the conflict and reduce actions that present unintended consequences. This is exemplified in the two case studies discussed.

In Somalia and Yugoslavia the immediate cause of social collapse was economic. The states were fundamentally weak due to religious, cultural or ethnic tensions. The failure of the economy widened the rift between factions and accelerated the failure of the state. In the face of economic failure, poverty and despair the people turned to ethnic or religious heritage for succor. This ethnic or religious identity was used by unscrupulous individuals to worsen the tensions and vilify any group outside their own. By bringing up old hatreds the different ethnic groups placed blame on the shoulders of opposing ethnic groups for the problems brought about by the failed economy and dissolution of the state.

The conventional aspects of Phase II, Describe the Battlefields Effects still have utility in peace operations. The requirement to separate potentially belligerent forces and the protection of friendly forces requires the same analysis of the impact of the physical qualities of

the battlefield as in conventional operations. The adjustments needed for Phase II pertain to the population. Just as an assessment of the interaction of the weather and terrain is analyzed so must an assessment of the interaction of the population be analyzed. The analysis of the interaction of the population goes beyond the nature of interpersonal relations among members of rival factions. An additional question is the interaction between the ethnic cultures. The question of how they interact and why is a critical question for peace operations.

In both case studies the populations that are in conflict interacted in a relatively peaceful manner at some point in history. In evaluating the effects of the battlefield some resolution on the change in interaction over time can be assessed. This done, an analysis of the nature of the change and the reason for it can be identified. This analysis can provide at least some clue to the cause of the conflict.

The evaluation of the threat in Phase III of the IPB process again fulfills the need to support potential conventional military operations in a peace operation. The current model needs modification to adequately support peace operations. Critical to adjusting this phase to a peace environment is placing the threat as a subset of a larger picture.

In evaluating the situation in peace operations recognition of the sources of power of the factions involved is critical. Possession of an armed militia is a source of power and certainly an inducement to cooperate. However the possession of an armed force cannot be regarded as the key source of power. In both case studies the true source of power for all the factions involved, whether they are militias in Somalia or the Bosnian Serb Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the identification of the people with their clan or ethnic group. This affiliation is a unifying concept. It is that identification with and loyalty to a particular group that enables their transformation into a militant faction.

The movement to armed conflict is a symptom of a social group striving to survive amongst perceived threats. Those threats are often the invention of opportunists who see

instigating conflict as a method of gaining or keeping power. In the case of Somalia the opportunists include Siad Barre and the warlords who followed. Siad Barre used clan conflict to prevent the development of a strong unified effort to supplant him. The warlords used clan conflict to establish their base of power then expand it.

The advent of Somali militias was a response or feedback of the system to changes made during the colonial period and early independence. In essence the system mutated as a result of the colonial experience and Siad Barre's regime. The clans transformed into armed militias whose leadership did not resemble the traditional clan leadership. The transformation changed the clans from pastoral familial organizations into armed bands fighting for hegemony.

Like Somalia, individuals in Bosnia such as Radovan Karadzic were able to play upon the strong affiliation the population had with their ethnic heritage. Using old hatreds coupled with a strong ethnic identification, ethnic leaders were able to translate economic problems and uncertainty into action. The action consisted of attempting to consolidate control over areas inhabited by other ethnic groups. An enabler of this action was the perception fostered among the population that troubles experienced by their group were the responsibility of other ethnic groups.

With the identification of ethnic groups as the center of power in the case studies, an assessment of how to influence that center of power can be assessed. Just as vulnerabilities and weaknesses are evaluated in conventional IPB the vulnerabilities of rival factions need evaluation in peace operations. The nature of the vulnerabilities are essentially different than those in conventional IPB. For peace operations the focus needs to be on those factors that can be influenced which lead to cessation of conflict. The factors available for influence may be economic, political or religious. Ensuring access to a livelihood or to practice religion may disarm those elements of a group that encourage conflict.

The final phase of IPB, Determine Threat Courses of Action as described in FM 34-130 has continuing utility for peace operations. Again, the rationale is the potential for armed conflict during the execution of a peace operation. The critical change is not to evaluate the impact of threat courses of action solely on friendly forces. Threat courses of action must be evaluated against reactions by opposition groups and friendly forces. In addition, potential courses of action for factional elements in a peace operation must also be evaluated against the criteria of protecting that group's center of power and the perceived legitimacy of the cause.

Not only must the possible actions of groups in conflict be evaluated but friendly courses of action must be evaluated as well. Friendly actions impact all elements of the system. An act taken against one faction may lead to opposition groups taking advantage of that action to further their own cause. In addition any act seen as showing favoritism may engender the perception of bias or disdain.

The IPB process is the primary tool for commanders and staffs to understand the battlefield. It must provide a vehicle to cause intelligence staffs to seek relevant information. The current IPB model is primarily a tool to understand the complexity of conventional operations and thus the analysis it generates fails to provide the type information required in peace operations.

The United States policy of global engagement ensures continued commitment of U. S. military forces in peace operations. To maximize chances for success in peace operations the analytical framework used by intelligence staffs must focus on providing commanders pertinent intelligence and information. This intelligence includes conventional information on armed forces but peace operations require a deeper understanding of the society and its history.

Providing the required information to adequately support commanders in peace operation necessitates adjustment of the IPB process. These adjustments must provide for

objective evaluation of the society, religion, economics, ethnicity, history and the impact of the interaction among all those factors.

Endnotes

¹ The national Security Strategy declares the United States must be willing to use all elements of national power to ensure that economic and political justice is available to all nations. U. S. President, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington DC: U.. S. Government Printing Office, 1998) p 1-2.

² FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, September 1994), 209.

³ FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, December 1994), 1.

⁴ FM 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*, draft (Washington DC: Department of the Army, September 1995), 5-1

⁵ FM 100-23, V.

⁶ FM 100-20, The update to FM 100-20 is not approved doctrine and contains a disclaimer that it is still under development. *Stability and Support Operations*, i.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p 5-1

⁸ JP 3.07, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, (Washington DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Electronic Library June 1995), II-6.

⁹ FM 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-4, 2-5.

¹⁰ JP 3-07, II-4

¹¹ *Ibid.*, II-4

¹² *Ibid.*, II-5

¹³ *Ibid.*, II-5

¹⁴ FM 34-1, 209

¹⁵ FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, (Washington DC,: Department of the Army, July 1994), 1-1

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, I-iv.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-1

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-4, 2-6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2-3

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2-7

²¹ *Ibid.*, 2-30

²² *Ibid.*, 2-39

²³ Each phase of the IPB process is designed to extract information from the battlefield that may have an impact on friendly or enemy operations. These pieces of information are merged into a holistic picture of the battlefield for the commander and staff. It is based on this picture that the commander and staff design and wargame courses of action. FM 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, May 1997,), 5-1. Fm 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, chapter 2.

²⁴ FM 34-130, 2-34.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, chapter 2

²⁶ The 1993 version of FM 34-7 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations is still valid doctrine and has not been superseded. FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, May 1993).

²⁷ FM 34-7, 3-1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 3-4

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3-5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 3-12

³¹ FM 34-130, 1-3.

³² FM 34-7, 3-6, 3-7.

³³ FM 100-23, iv-vi.

³⁴ FM 34-7, 3-6.

³⁵ Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Peace Support Operations and the US Military*, ed Dennis J. Quinn, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), XIV.

³⁶ Jeremy Dick, "Tailoring the MI Basic Load," *Military Intelligence* 22 (January-March 1996): 22.

³⁷ FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations* chapter III, ACofS G2, 82nd Airborne Division, *Intelligence Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Operations Other Than War*, (Fort Bragg NC: 82nd Airborne Division, July 1994) chapter II.

³⁸ FM 100-23, iv.

³⁹ See Dick, "Tailoring the MI Basic Load," 22, Marc Fontain, "Tactical Military Intelligence, IPB and the UN," *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 24 (November-December 1995), 9, Michael W. Schellhammer, "Lessons From Operation Restore Democracy," *Military Intelligence* 22 (January-March 1996): 18.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴¹ Schellhammer, 20.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴³ MG David Grange and LTC John Rovegno, "Shaping the Environment", *Armed Forces Journal International*, 136 March 1998, 44-45.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 44-45

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 44-45

⁴⁶ Tom Czerwinski, "Nonlinearity, An Introduction," *Coping with the Bounds*, ed. Tom Czerwinski, (Washington DC: NDU Press 1998) 9.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁸ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, (New York: Doubleday, 1990). 68-69.

⁴⁹ FM 100-23, iv-v.

⁵⁰ Robert Jervis, "From Complex Systems, The Role of Interactions," *Coping with the Bounds*, ed. Tom Czerwinski, (Washington DC: NDU Press 1998), 9.

⁵¹ Tom Czerwinski, "From Complex Systems, The Role of Interactions," 14-15.

⁵² Jervis, 259-260.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 263.

⁵⁴ See Ludwig von Bertalanfy, *General System Theory*, (New York: George Braziller Inc. 1968), 43-44, Robert Jervis, "From Complex Systems, The Role of Interactions," 263-264.

⁵⁵ Jervis, 268.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 269-270.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 267.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 267-268.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 267-268.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 273.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 261.

⁶² Terrance J. Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia, State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 8.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 8, 10.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 11.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 17, 18, 19.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 22-23.

⁷⁷ William J. Dutsch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and "State Building" in Somalia." in *UN, Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Dutsch, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 315-316.

⁷⁸ See. Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia, State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, 39. Henry L. Stimson Center, *UN, Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Dutsch, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 322-323.

⁷⁹ Lyons and Samatar, 40.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 51.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 40, 46, 47, 49.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁸⁶ John Julius Norwich, *A Short History of Byzantium*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 303-306.

⁸⁷ William J. Dutsch and James A. Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia." in *UN, Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Dutsch, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 196.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁹¹ John Lewis Gaddis, "The Cold War, The Long Peace, and the Future," *The End of the Cold War, its Meanings and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 35, 37.

⁹² Henry L. Stimson Center, *UN, Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Dutsch, 197.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 197-198.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁹⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 36.

⁹⁹ Kaplan, 36.

¹⁰⁰ Donald M. Nicol. *The Last Centuries of Byzantium*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 349.

¹⁰¹ Kaplan, 26.

¹⁰² Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer*, (New York: Perennial Library, 1951), 61.

¹⁰³ Kaplan, 36-38.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 39-40.

¹⁰⁵ Dutsch and Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia.", 247.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 249.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 249.

¹⁰⁸ The modifications to the conventional IPB process as outlined FM 34-7 represent the most current intelligence doctrine for Peace Operations. FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations*, 3-1.

¹⁰⁹ FM 34-130, 2-3.

¹¹⁰ FM 34-7, 3-6. FM 34-130, 6-6.

Glossary

Humanitarian Assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. JP 1-02

Military Operations Other Than War. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. JP 1-02

Low Intensity Conflict. Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC. JP 1-02

Stability and Support Operations The use of military capabilities for any purpose other than war.

FM 101-5-1. See JP 3-07 and FM 100-20.

Peace Enforcement Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also **peace building; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations.** JP 1-02

Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. JP 1-02

Peace Operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. JP 1-02

Appendix 1

Information Preparation for Stability and Support Operations (IPS)

Phase I, Define the Environment

1. Define the Area of operations. This is no change from the current IPB process.
2. Define the Area of Interest.
 - a. Establish the limits of the AI. The difference in this model is the evaluation of the current situation and major events in the history of the population. The critical historical information may provide a clue to the development of the current conflict. AI is expanded from a three dimensional evaluation to include the element of time and the evolution of the society.
 - b. Identify significant characteristics of the environment. As discussed in FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations*. The major characteristics of the AO are identified in gross terms to include geography, population demographics, infrastructure, the role of clans or ethnic groups, political, social and religious groups.

The changes include looking at the evolution of the roles of clans, ethnic groups, political, social and religious groups over time. An evaluation of their roles in a time of peace against current roles may indicate a change to the society and a clue to the cause of the conflict.

Phase II, Describe the Environmental Effects.

1. Terrain analysis.

a. The first element in this phase of IPS matches against the requirements for conventional IPB. This includes that standard evaluation of terrain, infrastructure and obstacles. In a peace operation population is counted as an element of terrain. An in depth evaluation of the population includes the factors listed in FM 34-7. In addition this phase includes an analysis of the interactions of the population. Not as groups but as individuals. The focus is to establish a difference in the type relationship that exists between individuals of one faction and the others. This relationship is evaluated over time. Significant changes in the interpersonal relationships are noted along with the time. This is matched against the analysis conducted in phase one of the roles and relationships of various groups within the population.

b. Weather Analysis. Weather is analyzed according to the process and factors of analysis as listed in FM 34-130.

Phase III Evaluate the Situation.

1. Update or create threat models for the armed elements.
2. Identify the objectives of factional leaders. These are not necessarily military but political, informational, or economic goals. These objectives are also assessed in the framework of the roles of ethnic, religious and political groups identified in phases one and two.
3. Identify possible actions to achieve those objectives. This equates to threat models. An evaluation of past actions used to gain objectives are evaluated. These potentially include information campaigns or armed operations to either maintain the integrity of the faction he leads or gain additional territory.

Phase IV Evaluate and Determine Courses of Action

1. Identify factional objectives and endstate.
2. Based on the objectives of the leadership the series of actions to gain that end state are evaluated. These evaluations are based on past patterns of operation.
3. Evaluate and prioritize each course of action. Evaluate each course of action against those of the other factions. The probable factional courses of action must be judged against those of the other factions. This involves wargaming the full set of reactions of both the initiator and others in the AO.

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